Counter Enlightenment
Hegel's Science of Logic (2)
In the first conversation in the Science of Logic pre-course series, I discussed with Layman Pascal his “Metaphysics of Adjacency” (MoA), which brought us towards thinking spaces of closeness (or highly sensitive spaces); and in the second conversation, I discuss with Daniel Garner (of O.G. Rose), his idea of the Modern Counter-Enlightenment, which brings us towards thinking the irreducible negativity inherent to reason itself. I open the discussion with an important Counter-Enlightenment thought from philosopher Slavoj Žižek in order to situate this idea within the foundations of Hegelian logic, who states in his absolute classic Less Than Nothing:
In the pre-Kantian universe, humans were simply humans, beings of reason, fighting the excess of animal lust and divine madness; only German Idealism does the excess to be fought become absolutely immanent, located at the very core of subjectivity itself (which is why, with German Idealism, the metaphor for that core is the night, the “night of the world,” in contrast to the Enlightenment notion of the Light of Reason dispelling the surrounding darkness).1
Of course, Kant is here responsible for “castrating” reason (see: Critique of Pure Reason). However, it is Hegel, and specifically his work in the Science of Logic, which sets us on the path to understanding a reason which, far from dispelling the surrounding darkness, is capable of containing the surrounding darkness (in the unity of being-nothing) for the truth of becoming of reason itself. The infamous reversal between Kant and Hegel, fully on display in the work of Žižek, is that, while Kant sees the antinomies and limits of Reason as opening up a space for Faith, Hegel sees the antinomies and limits of Reason as the power of Reason itself. In other words, whereas Aristotle would ground our logic of the consistent identity of our categories, Hegel would fully explode the coordinates of our identity with the absolutisation of rational antinomies, limits or contradictions. The task here, following Hegel, and I would dare say, the task Counter-Enlightenment thought, is not the banishing of Reason for an unintelligible or irrational Mystical Other, but rather to see in our rational antinomies, limits and contradictions, the very truth of our becoming (and also the call to real thinking; the call, to philosophy).
The call to philosophy is a difficult one, and while we are all situated within philosophical mysteries by virtue of being human, the task of embodying philosophical thought proper, may not be for everyone. This may be one of the reasons why what Daniel Garner calls the Counter-Enlightenment, which has expressions and manifestations in the work of David Hume’s Scottish Enlightenment, as well as in more contemporary thinkers like Maurice Blondel, Benjamin Fondane, Paul Feyerbrand, Alfred North Whitehead, Henri Bergson, Giambattista Vico, and others, has been the “road-less-travelled” (so to speak), in the history of modern philosophy. Modern philosophy has tended towards a type of progressivist teleology towards a utopian state for identity, via the use of the “Light of Reason” (dispelling the surrounding darkness).2 Garner will frequently counter this tendency in his philosophical work under the idea that “The True is Not the Rational,” and constantly emphasise that the logic of identity is not the logic of truth (here we often see the logical notations of A/A vs. A/B). Whereas the logic of identity seeks to reify a certain self-notion (e.g. Liberal Democrat, Christian Conservative, Revolutionary Marxist, etc.), the logic of truth requires a deeper tarrying with the core of negativity which explodes the very coordinates of self-identity itself. This is the meaning of self-relating negativity (which I have discussed with Layman Pascal at length).
For Hegel, and for the Counter-Enlightenment, a form of thinking which too quickly reifies a certain identity (e.g. Liberal Democrat, Christian Conservative, Revolutionary Marxist) in order to guarantee a positive outcome in the historical process (i.e. progressive teleology towards a utopian state for identity), is a profoundly misguided way to reason your way out of the real of truth. True, there is a type of “progressivism” in Hegel (here think the central importance of the mechanisms of sublation, idealisation, and so forth), but this progressivism is a progressivism towards ever-greater intractable problems (antinomies, limits and contradictions). For Hegel, the more intractable the antinomy, the “greater the progress,” and the greater the need for a Reason capable of thinking the Truth of its becoming. In this way, Hegel would counter Enlightenment thinking that “science and reason” “make things better,” with the idea, not that we should get rid of “science and reason,” but with the idea that “science and reason” “present us with deeper antinomies.” This is a big difference, because it brings us to the affective dimension: is humanity really ready to confront the depth of antinomic tension that is emerging from a fully interconnected digital world.3
This may seem like you are (we are all) on a head-on collision with a giant headache. However, what opens for the philosophical mind here is the indestructibility of the rational drive. The rational drive is not a rational totalisation, and nor is it an obfuscation of basic biological needs or instincts. The rational drive is the embodiment of reason itself, its silent, perpetual motion; its seemingly infinite capacity to tarry with intractable situations (what are often called “wicked problems” in the contemporary scientific literature).4 Consider a global problem on the level of Climate Change or Technological Automation.5 Both of these phenomena present humanity as a totality with intractable situations. For Hegel, there is a certain “progress” here. When we compare our system now to our system in some distant past (say the 16th or 17th centuries), the progress can be found in the qualitative difference between our “wicked problems.” This is the “Counter-Enlightenment” task for reason: to confront the truths of these antinomies. In other words, to set for itself the task of really thinking.
When it comes to both situations, Climate Change and Technological Automation, there is no clear utopian solution, and there is even no solution in principle. What we have is an on-going unfolding of the human notion on the global level (which severely disturbs global climate, and introduces technologies that replace basic human work functions). We read Hegel, and we acquaint ourselves with the logic of the Counter-Enlightenment, so that we can bring ourselves to the standpoint of thought that can truthfully work with these intractable situations, in a way that avoids the temptations of reason to simplistic utopian solutions. For Garner, this is necessary so that we can avoid the temptations of:
Conservative Post-Modernism (where we see a multiplicity of Truths, e.g. Alexander Dugin’s “Russian Truth” versus “Western Truth”), or
Existential Nihilism (human reality is basically absurd, tragic, doomed, etc.), or
Neoliberal Individualism (where essential difference is taken to an extreme beyond relationality, possibly an end-game attributable to the logic of Gilles Deleuze).
In contrast to these positions, the position of the Counter-Enlightenment is to establish that:
there is a “Truth of Negativity” that unifies us all (independent of whether we are Russian, Western, Indian, African, or whatever),
that existence is absurd, tragic, and doomed, but at least we have the Truth of the Concept (where things-in-themselves are reconciled for-us), and
where the extremes of individualism and communalism, are navigated by the rational drive, which is capable of thinking antinomy, limits and contradictions for both self and other
If you want to listen to my conversation with Garner in full, see here; if you want to read Garner’s article, see here; and if you want to join Daniel and I for deeper meditations and reflections on topics in this direction, consider signing up for the Science of Logic course, which starts January 16th 2023.
Žižek, S. 2012. Fichte’s Choice. In: Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism. London: Verso. p. 166.
One can see a recent expression of this thought in the work of cognitive scientist Steven Pinker, see: Pinker, S. 2018. Enlightenment Now. Viking. Here our thinking is always under the progressivist idea that “science and reason” “make things better.”
For more, see: Last, C. 2020. Global Brain Singularity: Universal History, Future Evolution and Humanity’s Dialectical Horizon. Springer.
Ritchey, T. 2013. Wicked problems. Acta morphologica generalis 2.1.
For more on how to think the political dimension of wicked problems, see my paper on the Global Commons: Last, C. 2017. Global Commons in the Global Brain. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 114: 48-64. DOI: 10.1016/j.techfore.2016.06.013.